AirCollect: Efficiently Recovering Hashed Phone Numbers Leaked via Apple AirDrop

AuthorHeinrich, Alexander; Hollick, Matthias; Schneider, Thomas; Stute, Milan; Weinert, Christian
TypeConference Proceedings
AbstractApple’s file-sharing service AirDrop leaks phone numbers and email addresses by exchanging vulnerable hash values of the user’s own contact identifiers during the authentication handshake with nearby devices. In a paper presented at USENIX Security’21, we theoretically describe two attacks to exploit these vulnerabilities and propose “PrivateDrop” as a privacy-preserving drop-in replacement for Apple’s AirDrop protocol based on private set intersection. In this demo, we show how these vulnerabilities are efficiently exploitable via Wi-Fi and physical proximity to a target. Privacy and security implications include the possibility of conducting advanced spear phishing attacks or deploying multiple “collector” devices in order to build databases that map contact identifiers to specific locations. For our proof-of-concept, we leverage a custom rainbow table construction to reverse SHA-256 hashes of phone numbers in a matter of milliseconds. We discuss the trade-off between success rate and storage requirements of the rainbow table and, after following responsible disclosure with Apple, we publish our proof-of-concept implementation as “AirCollect” on GitHub.
Conference14th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
InWiSec '21: Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, p.371-373