DLS in Cyber­security with Daniel Keim: The Power of Visual Analytics for Security Applications

Abstract:
Smart contracts are applications that run on and inherit the special properties of blockchains. These properties alone, though, do not make smart contracts broadly useful. Persistence prevents tampering, but makes errors irreversible. Transparency supports behavioral assurances, but at the cost of confidentiality. 

CANCELLED: DLS in Cyber­security - Tracing Stolen Bitcoin

Unfortunately, this DLS in Cyber­security can not take place. It will be made up later.

Abstract:
We've been exploring how to track stolen bitcoin. Previous attempts to do this had got entangled in the problem of dealing with transactions that split bitcoin into change, or that consolidate smaller sums into larger ones, and with mining fees. One answer comes from an unexpected direction: a legal precedent in 1816....

DLS in Cyber­security with Ari Juels: Beyond Smarts: Toward Correct, Private, Data-Rich Smart Contracts

Abstract:
Smart contracts are applications that run on and inherit the special properties of blockchains. These properties alone, though, do not make smart contracts broadly useful. Persistence prevents tampering, but makes errors irreversible. Transparency supports behavioral assurances, but at the cost of confidentiality. 

DLS in Cyberecurity: Grand Research Challenges for Cyber­security of Critical Information and Infrastructures

Abstract:
Computing and communications infrastructures have become commodities which societies largely depend on, transacting huge quantities of data and exhibiting pervasive interconnections, sometimes in critical conditions. However, the actual magnitude that security and dependability risks may assume, is often misperceived. The information society has been assuming risk behaviours, without the adequate protection. Many stakeholders, not only end-users but vendors, service providers, public administrations and - what may be surprising - even governments, seem to ignore those risks, in different ways.

DLS in Cyber­security: From Provable Security to Secure Cryptographic Implementations

Abstract
Building secure cryptographic implementations is notoriously hard. In this talk, I will outline a general methodology that delivers formal guarantees on assembly-level implementations through a combination of ideas from deductive program verification, program analysis, and verified compilation.

DLS in Cyber­security: Secure Deduplication - Models and Optimization

Abstract
Deduplication is a widely used mechanism in cloud storage systems which can greatly increase efficiency. The basic idea is to remove duplicate stored files, replacing copies with a pointer to a single version. Empirical evidence shows that deduplication can be extremely effective in reducing both storage requirements and bandwidth used for uploading. However, deduplication also introduces severe challenges to security. There is an inherent conflict between the use of deduplication and the desire of users to encrypt their files prior to uploading. Even if this problem can be solved, client-side deduplication opens up a side channel which can reveal information to an adversary, as shown in 2010 by Harnik et al.

DLS in Cyber­security: Security as a Science - Are we making progress?

Abstract
Recent years have seen increasing calls to make security research more “scientific”. Who can argue with science being desirable? But what exactly do people mean when they suggest this, and what are they really seeking? There is little clarity on what a “Science of Security” would look like. We consider this question, in the context of historical science and more recent security research, offer observations and insights, and suggest where things might be improved.

DLS in Cyber­security: Sanctum - Towards an Open-Source, Formally-Verified Secure Processor

Abstract
Architectural isolation can be used to secure computation on a remote secure processor with a private key where the privileged software is potentially malicious as recently deployed by Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX). This talk will first describe the Sanctum secure processor architecture, which offers the same promise as SGX, namely strong provable isolation of software modules running concurrently and sharing resources, but protects against an important class of additional software attacks that infer private information by exploiting resource sharing....

DLS in Cyber­security: New Threat Models for Cryptography

Abstract
Traditionally cryptography is used to protect communications and stored data. The cost of strong cryptography has been decreasing and today cryptography is used in tens of billions of devices. However, it has become apparent that ever more sophisticated attacks are launched to undermine or bypass cryptography: these attacks include compromising end systems, exploiting vulnerabilities in key management procedures, and inserting backdoors in cryptographic standards. We conclude by analyzing how these new threat models affect future research in cryptology and information security.

DLS in Cyber­security: Building Robust Distributed Systems and Network Protocols

Abstract
Most distributed systems and network protocols are designed to meet fault-tolerance, performance, and security goals. The high-level steps involved in the life cycle of a protocol development include protocol specification, design, implementation, and deployment....