Publikationen

Autor	Lahr, Norman; Niederhagen, Ruben; Petri, Richard; Samardjiska, Simona
Datum	2020
Art	Conference Paper
Abstrakt	This paper presents an attack based on side-channel information and (ISD) on the code-based Niederreiter cryptosystem and an evaluation of the practicality of the attack using an electromagnetic side channel. We start by directly adapting the timing side-channel plaintext-recovery attack by Shoufan et al. from 2010 to the constant-time implementation of the Niederreiter cryptosystem as used in the official FPGA-implementation of the NIST finalist ""Classic McEliece"". We then enhance our attack using ISD and a new technique that we call iterative chunking to further significantly reduce the number of required side-channel measurements. We theoretically show that our attack improvements have a significant impact on reducing the number of required side-channel measurements. For example, for the 256-bit security parameter set kem/mceliece6960119 of ""Classic McEliece"", we improve the basic attack that requires 5415 measurements to less than 562 measurements on average to mount a successful plaintext-recovery attack. Further reductions can be achieved at the price of increasing the cost of the ISD computations. We confirm our findings by practically mounting the attack on the official FPGA-implementation of ""Classic McEliece"" for all proposed parameter sets.
Konferenz	International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (ASIACRYPT) 2020
Url	https://publica.fraunhofer.de/handle/publica/409972