Publikationen

Autor	Fischlin, Marc; Sanina, Olga
Datum	2024
Art	Conference Proceedings
Abstrakt	The Bluetooth protocol for wireless connection between devices comes with several security measures to protect confidentiality and integrity of data. At the heart of these security protocols lies the Secure Simple Pairing, wherewith the devices can negotiate a shared key before communicating sensitive data. Despite the good intentions, the Bluetooth security protocol has repeatedly been shown to be vulnerable, especially with regard to active attacks on the Secure Simple Pairing. We propose here a mechanism to limit active attacks on the Secure Connections protocol (the more secure version of the Secure Simple Pairing protocol), without infringing on the current Bluetooth protocol stack specification. The idea is to run an authentication protocol, like a classical challenge-response step for certified keys, within the existing infrastructure, even at a later, more convenient point in time. We prove that not only does this authentication step ensure freshness of future encryption keys, but an interesting feature is that it---a posteriori ---also guarantees security of previously derived encryption keys. We next argue that this approach indeed prevents a large set of known attacks on the Bluetooth protocol.
Konferenz	2024 Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2024)
ISBN	979-8-4007-0636-3
In	Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, p.4762-4776
Publisher	ACM
Url	https://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/157550