Information-Theoretic Security of Cryptographic Channels

AutorFischlin, Marc; Günther, Felix; Muth, Philipp
ArtConference Proceedings
AbstraktWe discuss the setting of information-theoretically secure channel protocols where confidentiality of transmitted data should hold against unbounded adversaries. We argue that there are two possible scenarios: One is that the adversary is currently bounded, but stores today's communication and tries to break confidentiality later when obtaining more computational power or time. We call channel protocols protecting against such attacks future-secure. The other scenario is that the adversary already has extremely strong computational powers and may try to use that power to break current executions. We call channels withstanding such stronger attacks unconditionally-secure.
Konferenz22nd International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2020)
InInformation and Communications Security, p.295-311
PublisherSpringer Nature