| Abstrakt | The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is the most successful routing defense mechanism currently deployed throughout critical Internet infrastructures around the world. According to recent works, RPKI deployment boasts over 55\% global prefix resource coverage, and at least 27\% global protocol enforcement; all this success over a short period of time. In this work, we investigate for the first time deployment trends of the Relying Party (RP), the RPKI component responsible for collecting and enforcing RPKI on routers. We map RP locations, deployment parameters, vulnerability distributions, and describe the evolution of deployment trends over two measurement periods three years apart. Through this exploratory analysis, we map global patterns and the preferred deployment configurations by network operators. We observe how within three years, RP traffic increased by 45\%, while 89\% of traffic stems from one software type. Our measurements show a strong preference by operators to self-host, coupled with inadequate rates of RP vulnerability mitigation. |
|---|