Publikationen

Autor	Dohmen, Henri; Hundt, Robin William; Khayata, Nora; Schneider, Thomas
Datum	2025
Art	Conference Proceedings
Abstrakt	Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to perform privacy-preserving computation on their secret data. MPC protocols based on secret sharing have high throughput which makes them well-suited for batch processing, where multiple instances are evaluated in parallel. So far, practical implementations of secret sharing-based MPC protocols mainly focus on runtime and communication efficiency, so the memory overhead of protocol implementations is often overlooked. Established techniques to reduce the memory overhead for constant-round garbled circuit protocols cannot be directly applied to secret sharing-based protocols because they would increase the round complexity. Additionally, state-of-the-art implementations of secret sharing-based MPC protocols are implemented in C/C++ and maybe exhibit memory unsafety and memory leaks which could lead to undefined behavior. In this paper, we present SEEC: SEEC Executes Enormous Circuits, a framework for secret sharing-based MPC with a novel approach to address memory efficiency and safety without compromizing on runtime and communication efficiency. We realize SEEC in Rust, a language known for memory-safety at close-to-native speed. To reduce the memory footprint, we develop an in-memory representation for sub-circuits. Thus, we never inline sub-circuit calls during circuit evaluation, a common issue that blows up memory usage in MPC implementations. We compare SEEC with the state-of-the-art secret sharing-based MPC frameworks ABY (NDSS'15), MP-SPDZ (CCS'20), and MOTION (TOPS'22) w.r.t. runtime, memory, and communication efficiency. Our results show that our reliable and memory-safe implementation has competitive or even better performance.
Konferenz	20th ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS'25)
ISBN	979-8-4007-1410-8
In	ASIA CCS '25: Proceedings of the 20th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, p.118-135
Publisher	ACM
Url	https://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/id/eprint/160283